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In early March, 2006, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an-
nounced that his country would take measures toward making the rupee 
a convertible currency. Capital controls would be dismantled, and freer in-
ternational mobility of capital would be allowed.1 This step was unthink-
able only a few years back; for decades analysts associated India with a
strict policy of capital controls and restrictions. Indeed, in his criticism of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Stiglitz (2002) argued that the
fundamental reason why India and China had been spared from massive
currency crises was that they did not allow free capital mobility. Stiglitz
went even further and argued that the easing of controls on capital mobil-
ity was at the center of most (if not all) of currency crises in the emerging
markets during the last decade—Mexico 1994, East Asia 1997, Russia
1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey 2001, and Argentina 2002.
Whether capital controls are beneﬁcial for emerging countries continues
to be a controversial issue among experts. Those authors that support cap-
ital controls have argued two important beneﬁts: (a) capital controls re-
duce a country’s vulnerability to external shocks and currency crises, and
(b) they allow countries that have suﬀered a currency crisis implement
progrowth policies and emerge out of the crisis sooner than what they
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1. See “India Plans to Remove Controls on the Rupee,” Financial Times, March 20, 2006.capital account, controlling capital outﬂows would give crises countries
additional time to restructure their ﬁnancial sectors in an orderly fashion.2
The overall argument of controls supporters may be summarized as fol-
lows: “stricter controls on capital mobility reduce the costs of external
crises in emerging countries.”
Interestingly, most of the evidence in support of this claim has been
country speciﬁc. There have been no attempts at analyzing large data sets
that would include the experience in many countries. In part, this paucity
of empirical analyses is the consequence of the diﬃculty in measuring the
degree of capital mobility accurately (Eichengreen 2001). In this paper I
use a broad multicountry data set to analyze the relationship between re-
strictions to capital mobility and currency crises. The analysis focuses on
two deﬁnitions of currency crises: (a) a substantial change in an index of
macroeconomic stability, calculated as a weighted average of nominal ex-
change rate changes and changes (declines) in the stock of international re-
serves3and (b), a signiﬁcant change in the nominal exchange rate that is not
accompanied by a (very) large change in international reserves. I am par-
ticularly interested in addressing the following two speciﬁc questions:
• What are the eﬀects of these two diﬀerent types of crises on real eco-
nomic growth?
• Does this eﬀect depend on the degree of capital mobility in the coun-
try in question?
Both of these questions are related to the “contractionary devaluation”
issue, ﬁrst addressed by Hirschmann (1949) and Diaz-Alejandro (1963,
1965) and recently discussed by a number of authors including Calvo
(1999) and Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004). In traditional open econ-
omy models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition, a currency depreciation is
expansionary and results in an increase in aggregate demand. This is be-
cause the depreciation encourages net exports, without aﬀecting other eco-
nomic aggregates such as investment or consumption.4However, as Hirsch-
mann and Diaz-Alejandro point out, in more complete models there are a
number of reasons why a depreciation may be contractionary, at least in
the short run. This could be the case, for instance, if exports use imports as
intermediate inputs, or if there are distortions in the credit market, or if the
depreciation generates a substantial negative wealth eﬀect that aﬀects neg-
atively consumption or investment (Edwards 1989). Recently, a number of
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2. Most well-trained economists would agree that there are trade-oﬀs associated with the
imposition of capital controls. Whether the costs oﬀset the beneﬁts is a complex empirical
question, whose answer will depend on the speciﬁcities of each particular country. Doing a
full-blown cost-beneﬁt analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, however.
3. This is the traditional deﬁnition of “external crisis” proposed by Eichengreen, Rose, and
Wyplosz (1996).
4. This assumes that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds.authors have revisited the question of whether currency depreciations are
contractionary in the context of the “fear of ﬂoating” debate (Calvo and
Reinhart 2002). These authors, among others, have argued that because in
emerging countries many ﬁrms issue dollar-denominated debt, a large de-
preciation generates signiﬁcant “balance sheet eﬀects.” These may be so
large that they may more than oﬀset the positive eﬀects of a weaker cur-
rency on net exports. If this is indeed the case, an exchange rate deprecia-
tion will result in output contraction. From an empirical perspective, an
important question refers to the magnitude of these eﬀects and whether
they are diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of currency crises. In addition, from a
policy standpoint, it is important to investigate if these contractionary
eﬀects are diﬀerent in countries with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility.
I address these two questions in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2 I discuss the
evolution of capital account restrictions during the last thirty years. The
section opens with an analysis on the evolution of capital account open-
ness based on a new index, which I have constructed by combining three
data sources: (a) the index developed by Quinn (2003); (b) the index by
Mody and Murshid (2002); and (c) country-speciﬁc information obtained
from various sources, including country-speciﬁc sources (see Edwards
[2005] for further details). Section 3.3 deals with the anatomy of the two
types of currency crises described in the preceding. This analysis is per-
formed for three groups of countries classiﬁed according to the degree of
capital mobility: “low capital mobility,” “intermediate capital mobility,”
and “high capital mobility” countries. My main interest in this analysis is
to compare the two extreme groups: low and high capital mobility. In sec-
tion 3.4 I report new results on the costs of external crises. I am particularly
interested in determining if the cost of these three types of crises—mea-
sured in terms of lower growth—is diﬀerent for countries with diﬀerent de-
grees of capital mobility. Finally, in section 3.5 I provide some concluding
remarks. The paper also has a data appendix.
3.2 Thirty Years of Capital Mobility in the World Economy
In this section I discuss a new index on capital mobility, which was in-
troduced in Edwards (2005). I then analyze the evolution of restrictions to
capital mobility in the last three decades. The section ends with a brief
analysis of recent (last decade) episodes of capital account liberalization.
During the decade and a half, there has been an increase in the degree of
international capital mobility. There is not complete agreement, however,
on the exact magnitude of this phenomenon. The reason for this is that it
is very diﬃcult to measure in a precise way a country’s degree of capital
mobility. Indeed, with the exception of the two extremes—absolute free-
dom or complete closeness of the capital account—it is not easy to provide
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What has been particularly challenging has been constructing indexes that
allow for useful comparisons across countries and across time.5
In order to analyze the evolution of capital account restrictions, I con-
structed a new index on capital mobility that combines information from
Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002), with information from coun-
try-speciﬁc sources.6 In creating this new index, a three-steps procedure
was followed: ﬁrst, the scales of the Quinn and Mody and Murshid indexes
were made compatible (see Edwards [2005] for further details). The new in-
dex has a scale from 0 to 100, where higher numbers denote a higher degree
of capital mobility; a score of 100 denotes absolutely free capital mobility.
Second, I use STATA’s “impute” procedure to deal with missing observa-
tions in the new index. In order to impute preliminary values to the missing
observations, I use data on the two original indexes (Quinn and Mody and
Murshid), their lagged values, openness as measured by import tariﬀs col-
lections over imports, the extent of trade openness measured as imports
plus exports over gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of openness
obtained from the ﬁtted values of a gravity model of trade and GDP per
capita.7In the third step, I use country-speciﬁc data to revise and reﬁne the
preliminary data created using the impute procedure discussed in the pre-
ceding. The new index covers the period 1970 to 2000 and has data for 163
countries (although not every country has data for every year). It is impor-
tant to note that although this new index represents an improvement over
alternative indexes, it still has some shortcomings, including the fact that it
does not distinguish very sharply between restrictions on capital inﬂows
and restrictions on capital outﬂows.8
Figure 3.1 depicts the evolution of the index for six groups of countries:
(1) Industrial; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Asia; (4) Africa; (5)
Middle East and North Africa; and (6) Eastern Europe. This ﬁgure shows
that the degree of capital mobility has increased in every one of these six re-
gions during the last three decades. A comparison of the 1970 to 1989 and
the 1990 to 2000 period suggests that, on average, the industrial countries
made the most progress in moving toward greater capital mobility. The
Middle East and North African (MENA) region, on the other hand, expe-
rienced only moderate capital account liberalization. Figure 3.1 also shows
that this process of ﬁnancial openness has followed diﬀerent patterns in the
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5. Some studies that have attempted to measure the degree of capital mobility include Ed-
wards (1989), Klein and Olivei (1999), Leblang (1997), Razin and Rose (1994), Chinn and Ito
(2002), Montiel and Reinhart (1999), Quinn (1997), Edison et al. (2004), Quinn and Toyoda
(2003), Mody and Murshid (2002), Miniane (2004), and Quinn (2003).
6. For greater details, see Edwards (2005).
7. See Aizenman and Noy (2004) on the relationship between trade account openness and
capital account openness.
8. See the discussion in the preceding section for an analysis of the shortcomings of diﬀer-
ent indexes. See also Eichengreen (2001) and Edwards (1999).diﬀerent regions. For instance, in the industrial countries, it has been a rel-
atively smooth process. In the Latin American countries, the story is quite
diﬀerent. As may be seen, the region had stricter capital account restrictions
during the 1970s and 1980s; during the 1990s, on the other hand, the region
experienced an increase in capital mobility. In Asia, there was an increase in
capital mobility during the early 1990s, followed by a somewhat abrupt im-
position of controls after the 1997 crises. Since then, capital mobility has in-
creased somewhat. Eastern Europe is the region that has experienced the
greatest discrete jump in the degree of capital mobility.
I divide the sample into three equal-size groups depending on the extent
of mobility. These groups have been labeled High, Intermediate and Low
mobility.9 This three-way division of the sample clearly captures the fact
that the degree of capital mobility has increased signiﬁcantly during the
last thirty years. In 1970, 44 percent of the observations corresponded to
Low mobility, 26 percent to Intermediate, and 30 percent to High mobil-
ity. In the year 2000, in contrast, 24 percent of the observations corre-
sponded to Low mobility, 25 percent to Intermediate, and 52 percent to
High mobility. Table 3.1 contains summary data on the index of capital
mobility for the Low and High mobility groups.10As may be seen, the mean
and median values of the index are very diﬀerent across groups. Indeed a
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9. Because the unit of analysis is a country/year observation and there has been a trend to-
ward higher capital mobility (see ﬁgure 3.1), most observations in the High mobility group
correspond to recent country/year observations. Likewise, by construction most (but by no
means all) observations in the Low mobility group correspond to early (1970s and 1980s)
country/year observations.
10. In much (but not all) of the analysis that follows I will deal only with the Low and High
mobility groups. That is, in many of the results that follow the group of countries with Inter-
mediate mobility has been dropped.
Fig. 3.1 Capital mobility index, 1970–2000
Notes: 1   Industrial countries, 2   Latin American and Caribbean, 3   Asia, 4   Africa, 
5   Middle East, and 6   Eastern Europe.test with the equality of means indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected
at a high degree of conﬁdence (t-statistic   136.9).
In table 3.2, I present a list of nations with what I call “Very High” and
“Very Low” capital mobility. These two groups focus on the “extremes” of
the distributions and capture countries with an index value equal or higher
than 87.5 (for Very High) and an index value lower or equal to 12.5 (Very
Low).11As may be seen, while the number of countries with Very High cap-
ital mobility increased from decade to decade, the number with Very Low
mobility declined, until the 1990 to 2000 decade there were no nations with
an index value below 12.5.
3.3 The Anatomy of Currency Crises: Is There a Diﬀerence 
between High and Low Capital Mobility Countries?
3.3.1 Currency Crises: Deﬁnition
In this section, I investigate the nature of currency crises in the world
economy during the last thirty years. I am particularly interested in ﬁnding
out whether currency crises have had a higher incidence in countries with
a high degree of capital mobility.
The ﬁrst step in this analysis is the construction of two indexes of cur-
rency crises. The starting point is the deﬁnition of an index of “external
pressures” along the lines suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1996):
(1) It           ,
where ( e/e) is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and ( R/
R) is the rate of change of international reserves. A positive value of ( e/e)
represents a depreciation.  eis a standard deviation of changes in exchange
rates, and  R is the standard deviation of changes in international reserves.
Traditional analyses deﬁne a crisis (Ct) to have taken place when the index










11. These break-points were selected in an arbitrary fashion.
Table 3.1 Capital mobility index by groups
Standard
Group Mean Median deviation
Low capital mobility 30.0 37.5 9.9
High capital mobility 82.5 87.5 12.3Table 3.2 Countries with very high or very low capital mobility
Very high capital mobility
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–2000
Bahrain 87.5 Antigua and Barbuda 87.5 Austria 87.5
Gambia, The 87.5 Bahrain 87.5 Belgium 96.6
Germany 96.3 Germany 98.8 Canada 100.0
Hong Kong, China 95.0 Hong Kong, China 100.0 Denmark 100.0
Lebanon 87.5 Kuwait 87.5 Estonia 87.5
Panama 100.0 Lebanon 87.5 Finland 95.4
Switzerland 93.8 Netherlands, The 92.5 France 90.9
United Arab Emirates 87.5 Panama 95.0 Germany 100.0
United States 95.0 Singapore 100.0 Guatemala 100.0
Switzerland 100.0 Guatemala 100.0
United Arab Emirates 87.5 Ireland 93.1
United Kingdom 100.0 Italy 96.6
United States 100.0 Kuwait 87.5
Uruguay 95.0 Kyrgyz Republic 87.5














Very low capital mobility
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–2000
China 0.0 Bangladesh 12.5
Ethiopia 12.5 Iceland 12.5
Iceland 12.5 Morocco 10.0
Morocco 3.8 Sri Lanka 12.5
South Africa 7.3
Sri Lanka 12.5
Notes: Very high capital mobility countries are those with average mobility index higher or equal than
87.5. Very low capital mobility countries are those with average mobility index lower or equal than 12.5.The crisis indicator Ct takes a value of one (crisis) or zero (no crisis) ac-
cording to the following rule:12
(2) Ct   
In this paper I use a value of k   2 to deﬁne the basic Crisis Index. An im-
portant characteristic of this index is that it is possible to have a crisis even
if the exchange rate does not change in a signiﬁcant way. That is, it is pos-
sible that the depletion in reserves is so signiﬁcant, that on its own, it will
move index I by more than 2 standard deviations. In addition to the tradi-
tional index deﬁned in equations (1) and (2), I construct an alternative cri-
sis indicator that helps understand more fully the nature of the external
crises. This indicator is exchange rate driven and detects crises where the
currency depreciates very signiﬁcantly, while international reserves do not
decline in a substantial way. More speciﬁcally this alternative indicator—
which I call “Exchange Rate Crisis” (Crisis_Er)—is deﬁned as follows: The
index takes a value of one if the change in the nominal exchange rate, by it-
self, triggers the Ctcrisis indicator in equation (2). Here the country lets the
exchange rate depreciate signiﬁcantly, before it has experienced a major
loss in international reserves. That is, the country gives up defending the
peg before international reserves suﬀer a major depletion.
3.3.2 Currency Crises: Incidence
Table 3.3presents a summary of the occurrence of the two types of crises
for the complete sample as well as for each one of the six groups of coun-
tries deﬁned in ﬁgure 3.1. Table 3.3 also includes the Pearson tests for in-
dependence across groups. Three conclusions emerge from this table: (a)
surprisingly perhaps, the more general type of crisis captured by the index
Crisis Index has been a rather frequent event.13 For the sample as a whole,
the incidence is 15.3 percent. The highest incidence is in Asia and the
lowest in MENA; (b) the incidence of Crisis_Er is much lower than that of
the combined crisis; 7.0 percent versus 15.3 percent (this is not surprising,
given that the deﬁnition of Crisis_Er is stricter); and (c) the occurrence 
of Crisis_Er is statistically diﬀerent across regions (see the chi-square sta-
tistic).14
1 if It   mean (It) κ I,
0 otherwise
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12. The pioneer work here is Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), who suggested that
the index (2) also included changes in domestic interest rates. Most emerging and transition
economies, however, don’t have long time series on interest rates. For this reason, most em-
pirical analyses are based on a restricted version of the index, such as 2.
13. This is, in a way, by construction, since k was chosen to be equal to 2.
14. As it has been usually done in empirical work on crises, I also built alternative indica-
tors that considered a three-year window after each crisis. The results, however, are very sim-
ilar to those obtained when the basic deﬁnitions are used. For this reason, and due to space
considerations, I don’t report them in this paper.3.3.3 External Crises and Capital Mobility
The analysis presented in the preceding, on two diﬀerent types of crises
(table 3.3), did not group countries according to their degree of capital mo-
bility. In tables 3.4 and 3.5, I report their incidence for the two categories
of capital mobility deﬁned in the preceding: High, Intermediate, and Low
capital mobility. The tables also present the p-values for Pearson tests on
the equality of incidence under High mobility and Low mobility on the one
hand, and equality of incidence under High mobility and Intermediate
mobility, on the other hand (these tests are presented both at the country-
group as well as aggregate levels). The results obtained may be summarized
as follows:
• As may be seen from table 3.4, for the complete sample, the incidence
of the broad deﬁnition of crisis (Crisis Index) is lowest in the high cap-
ital mobility countries. This is the case in every subgroup, with the ex-
ception of the Eastern European countries.
• Table 3.5 shows that for the Crisis_Er deﬁnition of crisis there is no sig-
niﬁcant diVerence in incidence across capital mobility categories,
when the complete sample is analyzed. In three of the subgroups, how-
ever, the incidence of crisis is lowest in the High capital mobility coun-
tries: Industrial, Latin America, and Middle East.
The results presented in tables 3.4 and 3.5 were obtained when the con-
temporaneous value of the index was used to classify countries as having
High, Intermediate, or Low degree of capital mobility. It is possible to ar-
gue, however, that what matters is not the degree of capital mobility in a
particular year, but the policy stance on capital mobility in the medium
term. In order to investigate whether an alternative classiﬁcation makes a
diﬀerence, I reclassiﬁed countries as High, Intermediate, and Low capital
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Table 3.3 Incidence of crises
Region Crisis index Exchange rate crisis
Industrial countries 12.5 4.5
Latin American and Caribbean 14.1 6.8
Asia 17.5 6.4
Africa 15.5 8.3
Middle East 12.0 4.3
Eastern Europe 31.3 17.2
Total 15.3 7.0
No. of observations 3,710 3,695
Pearson
Uncorrected χ2 (5) 33.0 34.1
Design-based F(5, 14710) 6.6 6.8
P-value 0.00 0.00mobility using the average value in the index in the previous ﬁve years. The
results obtained—not reported due to space considerations, but available
on request—are very similar to those reported in tables 3.4 to 3.5.
3.4 Capital Controls and the Costs of External Crises
In this section, I investigate whether external crises—as deﬁned by the
two indicators proposed above—have historically had signiﬁcant costs in
terms of a lower GDP growth. More important, in terms of the current pa-
per, I analyze whether the (potential) costs of external crises have been
diﬀerent in countries with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. As pointed
out earlier, this analysis deals with two important policy issues: the “con-
tractionary devaluation” controversy and the discussion on the eﬀective-
106 Sebastian Edwards
Table 3.4 Incidence of crisis index by categories of capital mobility
t-test
Region High Intermediate Low H = I H = L
Industrial 11.2 14.1 31.2 0.87 4.39**
Latin America and Caribbean 10.9 13.6 17.4 0.97 2.40**
Asia 13.9 23.5 17.5 1.88 0.97
Africa 17.7 15.6 15.0 0.61 0.80
Middle East 10.1 14.8 13.6 0.93 0.83
Eastern Europe 43.8 29.7 25.8 1.20 1.78
Total 12.8 16.2 17.0
P-value 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.00
Note: t-test is in absolute values.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 3.5 Incidence of exchange rate crisis by categories of capital mobility
t-test
Region High Intermediate Low H = I H = L
Industrial 3.3 6.6 9.8 1.65 2.44**
Latin America and Caribbean 4.9 6.3 8.8 0.71 1.94
Asia 7.9 11.8 3.7 0.96 1.86
Africa 10.6 7.0 8.7 1.40 0.71
Middle East 1.9 9.3 5.7 2.47** 1.61
Eastern Europe 25.0 20.0 11.5 0.48 1.69
Total 5.4 7.8 7.8
P-value 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.00
Note: t-test in absolute values.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.ness of capital controls. The section is organized as follows: I ﬁrst present
a preliminary analysis, where I compare growth before and after the two
types of crises, for countries with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. I
then present results obtained from an econometric analysis that uses ran-
dom eﬀect panel techniques to estimate the eﬀects of external crises on de-
viation of growth from their long-run trend. As pointed out, the main in-
terest in this analysis is to determine whether the extent of capital mobility
plays a role in explaining the costs associated with crises.
3.4.1 External Crises and Growth: A Preliminary Analysis
In table 3.6, I present a before and after analysis on GDP per capita
growth for the two deﬁnitions of crisis: Crisis Index and Crisis_Er. This
analysis has been done for all countries, as well as for countries grouped
according to their degree of capital mobility. The “before” data corre-
sponds to average GDP per capita growth during the three yearsbefore the
crisis. I have computed two “after” rates of growth: (a) the year of the cri-
sis, and (b) the average during three years after the crisis. Panel A in table
3.6 contains the results for one year after the crisis; panel B contains results
for three year after the crisis. The ﬁrst four columns in both panels in table
3.6 contain the average diﬀerence in the rate of per capita growth for after
and before the crisis (that is, it is deﬁned as the rate of growth after the cri-
sis, minus the rate of growth before the crisis). Column (1) is for all coun-
tries; columns (2) through (4) are for countries with High, Intermediate,
and Low capital mobility. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for
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Table 3.6 Before and after GDP per capita growth
All High Intermediate Low High-Intermediate High-Low
Event (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
A. Year of crisis
Crisis_Index –0.68 –1.10 –0.29 –0.66 –0.81 –0.83
(2.56)** (1.71)* (0.69) (1.86)* (1.06) (0.64)
Cri_Er –0.75 –2.13 –0.19 –0.33 –1.95 –1.81
(1.80)* (2.00)** (0.32) (0.56) (1.65)* (1.63)
B. During three years after crisis
Crisis_Index –0.12 –0.22 0.21 –0.27 –0.44 –0.25
(0.65) (0.55) (0.66) (1.04) (0.84) (0.11)
Cri_Er 0.00 –0.98 0.54 0.22 –1.53 –1.20
(0.02) (1.44) (1.10) (0.57) (1.84)* (1.66)*
Notes: Crisis_Index is a broadly deﬁned crisis; Cri_Er is exchange rate crisis. The “before” data corre-
sponds to average GDP per capita growth during the three years before the crisis. In Panel A, “after”
rates of growth is for year of the crisis. In Panel B, “after” is average growth rate during three years after
the crisis. Absolute value of t-test in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.the null hypothesis that the before and after rates of growth are equal. The
ﬁnal two columns are diﬀs-in-diﬀs columns, which report the diﬀerence in
the before and after growth rates for High and Intermediate and High and
Low capital mobility; that is the number in column (E) is equal to column
(B) minus (C). The number in parentheses is for the null hypothesis that
this diﬀs-in-diﬀs is equal to zero.
As may be seen from table 3.6, these (preliminary) results suggest that
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the before and after rates of per capita
growth when the shorter horizon is considered (panel A). These diﬀerences
appear to be somewhat larger in the High capital mobility countries (col-
umn [2]). For the three-years horizon, the diﬀs-in-diﬀs result for Cri_Er in
panel B suggest that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the diﬀerences in per
capita growth in countries with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. No-
tice that only seven out of the twenty-four t-statistics in table 3.6 are sig-
niﬁcant at conventional levels. As emphasized in the preceding, however,
these results are only preliminary as no attempt has been made to control
for other factors or to incorporate the determinants of the probability of a
crisis.15 In the subsection that follows I deal with these issues by using a
random eﬀect panel regression methodology.
3.4.2 An Econometric Analysis
In this subsection, I present results from an econometric analysis that
deals with two questions: (a) do currency crises—as deﬁned by the two in-
dicators discussed in the preceding—have a negative eﬀect on growth? and
(b) does the degree of capital mobility aﬀect the nature of this eﬀect?
Growth Eﬀects of Currency Crises: Preliminary Econometric Results
The point of departure of the empirical analysis is a two-equation em-
pirical model for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j
in period t. Equation (3) is the long-run GDP growth equation, while equa-
tion (4) captures the growth dynamics process.
(3) g ˜j    xj  rj    j
(4)  gjt   (g ˜j   gjt 1)   ϕvjt    ujt   εjt
g ˜j is the long-run rate of real per capita GDP growth in country j; xj is a
vector of structural, institutional and policy variables that determine long-
run growth; rj is a vector of regional dummies;  ,   and   are parameters,
and  j is an error term assumed to be heteroscedastic. In equation (4), gjt is
the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms vjt
and ujt are shocks, assumed to have zero mean, ﬁnite variance, and to be
uncorrelated among them. More speciﬁcally, vjt is assumed to be an exter-
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15. Hong and Tornell (2005), however, have used a similar methodology and found that
there are growth eﬀects of crises. Their deﬁnition of crisis, however, is diﬀerent from the two
deﬁnitions I have used here.nal terms of tradeshock, while ujtcaptures other shocks, including currency
crises. εjt is an error term, which is assumed to have a variance component
form, and  , ϕ, and   are parameters that determine the particular charac-
teristics of the growth process. Equation (4) has the form of an equilibrium
correction model and states that the actual rate of growth in period t will
deviate from the long-run rate of growth due to the existence of three types
of shocks: vjt, ujt and ξjt. Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will
tend to converge toward its long-run value, with the rate of convergence
given by  . Parameter ϕ, in equation (4), is expected to be positive, indi-
cating that an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (tempo-
rary) acceleration in the rate of growth and that negative terms of trade
shock are expected to have a negative eﬀect on gjt.16
If, as posited by the contractionary devaluation hypothesis, large depre-
ciations have a negative eﬀect on growth, we would expect the coeﬃcient  
to be signiﬁcantly negative. In the actual estimation of equation (4), I used
dummy variables for the crisis indicators. An important question—and
one that is addressed in detail in the subsection that follows—is whether
the eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks on growth are diﬀerent for countries with
diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. I address this issue by adding to the es-
timation of equation (4) a term that interacts the crisis indicator with the
index of capital mobility developed in the preceding.
Equations (3) to (4) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In the
ﬁrst step I estimate the long-run growth equation (3) using a cross-country
data set. These data are averages for 1970 to 2001, and the estimation
makes a correction for heteroscedasticity. These ﬁrst stage estimates are
then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace g ˜j in the
equilibrium error correction model (4). In the second step, I estimated
equation (4) using generalized least squares (GLS) for unbalanced panels;
I used both random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects estimation procedures.17 I cal-
culate robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. The data set
used covers 157 countries for the 1970 to 2001 period; not every country
has data for every year, however. See the data appendix for exact data def-
inition and data sources. In subsection 3.4.3, I present some extensions.
The results from the ﬁrst-step estimation of equation (3) are not reported
due to space considerations.18
Table 3.7 presents the results from the second-step estimation of the
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16. See Edwards and Yeyati (2005) for details.
17. Due to space considerations, only the random eﬀect results are reported.
18. In estimating equation (1) for long-run per capita growth, I follow the by now standard
literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and use average data
for 1974 to 2000. In terms of the equation speciﬁcation, I include the following covariates: the
log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education; an
index of the degree of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption rela-
tive to GDP; and regional dummies for Latin American, sub-Saharan African and Transition
economies. The results are quite standard and support what by now has become the received
wisdom on the empirical determinants of long-term growth.growth dynamics equation (3). The ﬁrst two equations refer to the broad cri-
sis indicator Crisis Index, while the next two equations focus on Crisis_Er.
As may be seen, the results are quite interesting. The estimated coeﬃcient
of the growth gap is, as expected, positive, signiﬁcant, and smaller than
one. The point estimates are on the high side—in the neighborhood of
0.80—suggesting that, on average, deviations between long-run and actual
growth get eliminated rather quickly. Also, as expected, the estimated co-
eﬃcients of the terms of trade shock are always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, indicating that an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of
trade results in an acceleration (deceleration) in the rate of growth of real
per capita GDP relative to its long-term trend. As may be seen, the coeﬃ-
cients of both external crises indicators are signiﬁcantly negative, providing
support to the contractionary devaluation hypothesis. The point estimates
for the Crisis_Er indicator is higher (in absolute values) than that for the
broader index Crisis Index. This suggests that using international reserves
to absorb part of the eﬀects of a crisis helps reduce its impact on GDP
growth. Finally, the results in table 3.7 indicate that lagged values of the cri-
sis indicators are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels and that the con-
tractionary eﬀect of an external crisis is concentrated on its ﬁrst year. No-
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Table 3.7 Currency crises and growth (random effects GLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth gap 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
(19.89)*** (19.68)*** (19.63)*** (19.53)***
Change in terms of trade 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(9.18)*** (9.21)*** (9.22)*** (9.25)***
Crisis index –0.91 –0.82
(3.72)*** (3.39)***






Constant –0.23 –0.18 –0.31 –0.26
(2.02)** (1.51) (2.84)* (2.41)**
No. of observations 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971
No. of countries 91 91 91 91
R2 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53
Notes: Crisis index is a broadly deﬁned crisis; Cri_Er is exchange rate crisis. Absolute value
of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcantly at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tice, however, that given the dynamics nature of equation (3), GDP growth
remains below potential growth for quite some time.
External Crises and Capital Mobility
An important issue in policy debates is whether, as suggested by some
authors such as Stiglitz (2002), countries that restrict capital mobility are
able to reduce the costs of external crises. In order to investigate whether
the degree of capital mobility aﬀects the cost of an external crisis charac-
terized by the two indicators deﬁned in the preceding, in the estimation of
the growth equation (4), I also included a variable that interacts each of the
crisis indicators with the capital mobility index. The results obtained are
reported in table 3.8. In the ﬁrst two columns, I used the broader Crisis
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Table 3.8 Currency crises, capital mobility, and growth (random effects
GLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth gap 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.82
(17.59)*** (16.95)*** (17.49)*** (17.91)***
Change in terms of trade 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(7.97)*** (8.08)*** (8.07)*** (8.09)***
Crisis index –1.18 –0.88
(3.41)** (1.81)*
Crisis index   Cap 0.005 0.001
(0.65) (0.15)
Lagged crisis index –1.00
(1.91)**








Lagged Cri_Er   Cap 0.01
(0.97)
Constant –0.24 –0.18 –0.32 –0.26
(1.58) (1.51) (2.33)** (1.84)*
No. of observations 1,942 1,937 1,942 1,937
No. of countries 90 90 90 90
R2 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53
Notes: Crisis index is a broadly deﬁned crisis; Cri_Er is exchange rate crisis; Cap is an index
of capital mobility. Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Index indicator of crisis; the two last columns are for the Crisis_Er indica-
tor. As may be seen, the coeﬃcient of the interacted variable is not signiﬁ-
cant in any of the regressions. In table 3.9, I investigate whether these re-
sults are aﬀected by the sample used. In table 3.9, I present results obtained
from emerging and transition countries only. The results, however, are very
similar to those presented in the preceding: once again, the variable that in-
teracts crisis and capital mobility is insigniﬁcant. This is the case in every
regression.
The results reported here suggest that countries that restrict capital mo-
bility have not expressed milder crisis than countries that allow for a freer
mobility of capital. These results, then, are at variance with the position
taken by a number of globalization critics that have argued that the pres-
ence of capital controls reduce the costs of crisis. These results, however,
should be considered as preliminary. The issue deserves more attention,
and additional research may result in diﬀerent results. Three aspects of 
this analysis deserve particular attention. First, and as discussed in section
3.2 of this paper, measuring capital mobility is a diﬃcult and challenging
enterprise. Eﬀorts should be made to improve the quality of these indexes.
Second, alternative deﬁnitions of crises should be considered. It is possible
that the degree of capital mobility has some eﬀects on the way some types
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Table 3.9 Currency crises, capital mobility, and growth (random effects
IV estimates)
(1) (2)
Growth gap 0.81 0.84
(29.51)*** (23.78)***












No. of observations 1,239 1,239
No. of countries 66 66
R2 0.45 0.41
Note: See table 3.8 notes.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.of crisis manifest themselves. Future research should concentrate on the
consequences of sudden stops as well as on current account reversals.19
And third, there may be issues of endogeneity. It is possible—although in
my opinion not very likely—that countries with decelerating growth are
the ones that experience currency crises. In the subsection that follows, I
address this speciﬁc issue, and I report results obtained when instrumental
variables versions of equation (4) were estimated.
3.4.3 Endogeneity and Robustness
The results presented in tables 3.7 and 3.8 assume that both crisis and
capital mobility are exogenous variables. However, as pointed out in the
preceding, this needs not be the case. In this subsection I report the results
obtained when equation (4) was estimated using an instrumental variables
random eﬀect procedure. I also discuss the results obtained when alterna-
tive time periods were used in the estimation and when diﬀerent samples
were considered. Finally, I investigate the role of (potential) outliers. As
will be seen, the results are robust to these alternative estimation procedure
and data sets and suggest that the eﬀects of external crises on economic ac-
tivity are not aﬀected by the degree of capital mobility.
Endogeneity
As pointed out in the preceding, it is possible that capital controls are en-
dogenous and that their level is aﬀected—through political economy chan-
nels—by the level of economic activity. For instance, it is possible that the
economic authorities restrict capital mobility when the economy enters
into a slowdown and allow capital to move more freely when the economy
is expanding. The external crises variables may also be endogenous and,
thus, were also instrumented. The following instruments were used in the
instrumental variables (IV) estimation of equation (4): a trade openness in-
dex computed by the ﬁtted value of the imports plus exports to GDP ratio
obtained from a gravity model of bilateral trade;20 a measure of unantici-
pated capital inﬂows;21 an index that measures the (lagged) incidence of
sudden stops in the country’s region;22 the lagged value of the current ac-
count balance; the lagged ﬁscal deﬁcit to GDP ratio; lagged and current
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19. In a recent paper on the growth consequences of current account reversals I found some
weak and preliminary evidence suggesting that countries with a more open capital account
experienced a higher growth reduction than countries with more restricted capital mobility.
20. Frankel and Cavallo (2004) have convincingly argued that this gravity-based index of
openness is exogenous. Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown that there is a close relation-
ship between trade and capital account openness.
21. This was computed from the residuals of a random eﬀect panel equation on capital
ﬂows to GDP for the countries in the sample.
22. I consider the same six regions as the ones used in the analysis reported in sections 3.2
and 3.3: Advanced countries, Latin America, Asia, Africa, Middle East and North Africa,
and Eastern Europe.changes in the terms of trade; the log of per capita GDP in 1970; and re-
gional dummies. The results obtained are reported in table 3.9. As may be
seen, the estimated coeﬃcients of the external crises indexes continue to be
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The coeﬃcients
of the growth gap and of the terms of trade are signiﬁcantly positive. Also,
as in the results reported in table 3.8, the coeﬃcient of the interactive vari-
able is insigniﬁcant.
Alternative Data Sets
In order to investigate the robustness of the results I reestimated equa-
tion (4) for alternative time periods and samples. In particular, I considered
data sets that covered the shorter 1982 to 2002 and 1987 to 2002 periods. I
also reestimated equation (4) for emerging countries only. The results for
these alternative data sets (not reported here due to space considerations,
and available on request) conﬁrmed the most important results from tables
3.7 and 3.8: (a) both types of external currency crises considered in this pa-
per had negative eﬀects on growth, and (b) there is no evidence indicating
that these eﬀects have been diﬀerent in countries that restrict capital mo-
bility than in countries with freer capital mobility.
Outliers
As a way to further investigate the robustness of the results I analyzed
whether the estimates reported in the preceding had been inﬂuenced by
outliers. I performed an inﬂuence analysis using Cook’s distance estima-
tors. The results indicate that the result obtained have not been aﬀected by
extreme or outlier observations.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have used a broad multicountry data set to analyze the re-
lationship between restrictions to capital mobility and external crises. The
analysis focuses on two manifestations of external crises. The analysis has
focused on the following important policy question: does the extent of cap-
ital mobility determine the depth of external crises—as measured by the
decline in growth—once a crisis occurs? In analyzing these issues I relied
on two complementary approaches: ﬁrst, I used a methodology based on
nonparametric tests. And second, I used a regression-based analysis that
estimates the eﬀects of external crises on the dynamics of economic growth.
Overall, my results cast some doubts on the assertion that countries that 
restrict capital mobility fare better during a crisis than countries with freer
mobility. These results cast doubts on the claims, made by a number of crit-
ics of globalization, that freer capital mobility ampliﬁes external crises
(Stiglitz 2002).
The issues discussed in this paper deserve more attention in the future.
114 Sebastian EdwardsIn particular, there are three aspects of this analysis that warrant addi-
tional research. First and foremost, measuring capital mobility is a diﬃcult
and challenging enterprise. Eﬀorts should be made to improve the quality
of these indexes. Although the measures of capital mobility used in this pa-
per represent a clear improvement over previous indexes, they still classify
countries in rather coarse groupings. Second, alternative deﬁnitions of
crises should be considered. It is possible that the degree of capital mobil-
ity has some eﬀects on the way some types of crisis manifest themselves.
Future research should concentrate on the consequences of sudden stops
as well as on current account reversals. And third, the analysis should be
expanded to the determinants of the probability of countries experiencing
a crisis. The question here is whether the extent of capital mobility aﬀects
the likelihood that a country will face a major external crisis.
Financial Openness, Currency Crises, and Output Losses 115
Appendix
Table 3A.1 Description of the data
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Index of capital Index: (low mobility) to 100 (high  Author’s elaboration based on 
mobillity mobility) indexes of capital restrictions
computed by Quinn (2003),
Mody and Murshid (2002),
and on country-speciﬁc data.
Growth gap Deviation from long-run economic Author’s elaboration. See text.
growth rate
Change terms Change in terms of trade-exports as World Development Indicators.
of trade capacity to import (constant LCU)
Crisis Index Dummy for broad deﬁnition of crisis Author’s elaboration. See text.
Crisis Er Dummy for exchange rate crisis Author’s elaboration. See text.
References
Aizenman, Joshua, and Ilan Noy. 2004. On the two way feedback between ﬁnancial
and trade openness. NBER Working Paper no. 10496. Cambridge, MA: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, May.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1995. Economic growth. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Calvo, Guillermo A. 1999. Fixed vs. ﬂexible exchange rates: Preliminaries of a turn-
of-millennium rematch. University of Maryland. Mimeograph.
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Carmen M. Reinhart. 2002. Fear of ﬂoating. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 117 (2): 379–408.
Cespedes, Luis F., Roberto Chang, and Andrés Velasco. 2004. Balance sheets and
exchange rate policy. American Economic Review 94:1183–93.Chinn, Menzie, and Hiro Ito. 2002. Capital account liberalization, institutional
and ﬁnancial development. NBER Working Paper no. 8967. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Díaz-Alejandro, Carlos F. 1963. A note on the impact of devaluation and the re-
distributive eﬀect. Journal of Political Economy 71:577–80.
———. 1965. Exchange rate devaluation in a semi-industrialized country: The expe-
rience of Argentina 1955–1961. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Edison, Hali, Michael W. Klein, Luca Ricci, and Torsten Sloek. 2004. Capital ac-
count liberalization and economic performance: Survey and synthesis. IMF
Staﬀ Papers 52 (1): 220–56. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Edwards, Sebastian. 1989. Real exchange rates, devaluation and adjustment. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 1999. How eﬀective are capital controls? Journal of Economic Perspectives
13 (4): 65–84.
———. 2005. Capital controls, sudden stops and current account reversals. NBER
Working Paper no. 11170. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, March.
Edwards, Sebastian, and Eduardo Levy Yeyati. 2005. Flexible exchange rates as
shock absorbers. European Economic Review 49 (8): 2079–2105.
Eichengreen, Barry J. 2001. Capital account liberalization: What do cross-country
studies tell us? The World Bank Economic Review 15:341–65.
Eichengreen, Barry J., Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz. 1996. Contagious
currency crises. NBER Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, MA: National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, July.
Frankel, Jeﬀrey A., and Eduardo Cavallo. 2004. Does openness to trade make
countries more vulnerable to sudden stops, or less? Using gravity to establish
causality. NBER Working Paper no. 10957. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research, December.
Hirschmann, Albert. 1949. Devaluation and the trade balance: A note. Review of
Economics and Statistics 31:50–53.
Hong, Kiseok, and Aaron Tornell. 2005. Recovery from a currency crisis: Some
stylized facts. Journal of Development Economics 76 (1): 71–96.
Klein, Michael W., and Giovanni Olivei. 1999. Capital account liberalization, ﬁ-
nancial depth and economic growth. NBER Working Paper no. 7384. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October.
Leblang, David A. 1997. Domestic and systemic determinants of capital controls
in the developed and developing world. International Studies Quarterly 41 (3):
435–54.
Miniane, Jacques. 2004. A new set of measures on capital account restrictions. IMF
Staﬀ Papers 51 (2): 276–308. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Mody, Ahoka, and Antu P. Murshid. 2002. Growing up with capital ﬂows. IMF
Working Paper no. WP/02/75. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund,
April.
Montiel, Peter, and Carmen Reinhart. 1999. Do capital controls and macroeco-
nomics policies inﬂuence the volume and composition of capital ﬂows? Evidence
from the 1990s. Journal of International Money and Finance 18 (4): 619–35.
Quinn, Dennis P. 1997. The correlates of changes in international ﬁnancial regula-
tion. American Political Science Review 91:531–51.
———. 2003. Capital account liberalization and ﬁnancial globalization, 1890–1999:
A synoptic view. International Journal of Finance and Economics 8 (3): 189–204.
Quinn, Dennis P., and Ana Maria Toyoda. 2003. Does capital account liberaliza-
tion lead to economic growth? An empirical investigation. Georgetown Univer-
sity. Mimeograph.
116 Sebastian EdwardsRazin, Asaaf, and Andrew K. Rose. 1994. Business cycle volatility and openness:
An exploratory cross-section analysis. In Capital mobility: The impact on con-
sumption, investment and growth, ed. L. Leiderman and A. Razin, Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and its discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.
Comment Edmar L. Bacha
Edwards’s paper is an important contribution to the debate on the im-
pact of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility. Reading this paper was for
me a most rewarding educational experience. But in my role as discussant
I focus on doubts and divergences.
First, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to understand Edwards’s postulated direction of
causality between current account reversals and gross domestic product
(GDP) slowdowns, for it is easy to understand that GDP contractions lead
to current account reversals, through fewer imports and more exports. The
reverse mechanism is less clear. Causality thus seems to be the opposite of
that assumed in the paper. The use of dummies to focus only on major cur-
rent account reversals does not seem to resolve this causality issue.
Second, sudden capital stops should lead ﬁrst to international reserve
losses and only then to GDP contractions. There is thus a time lag in the
causation chain that is not considered in the paper. Moreover, Edwards’s
net capital inﬂow variable seems to suﬀer from measurement problems.
The ﬁrst problem is that Edwards includes the “errors and omissions” item
of the balance of payments as part of the capital ﬂows, when in fact it also
includes unimputed current account items. One wonders if his economet-
ric tests would be robust to a shift to the current account of the “errors and
omissions” item. More importantly, compensatory/oﬃcial ﬁnancing is in-
cluded in the net capital inﬂow variable, thus making it less procyclical, as
output falls may be expected to be accompanied by more compensatory/
oﬃcial ﬁnancing. The relevant exogenous variable for Edwards’s tests
should be lagged net private capital inﬂow rather than current total capital
inﬂow. The use of an inadequate variable for capital inﬂows and the impact
of output changes on the trade balance may explain why Edwards ﬁnds
GDP contractions to have a weaker correlation with sudden stops than
with current account reversals.
A third problem is the use of a “country” independently of size as the
unit of observation. This tends to bias Edwards’s results toward the expe-
rience of the more fragile Africa’s and island economies. A weighted re-
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Edmar L. Bacha is director of the Casa das Garças Institute for Economic Policy Study in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.gression, with countries being weighted either by population or GDP,
would solve this problem.
My fourth point requires a digression on Brazil’s experience since 1970.
In table 3C.1, one can observe ﬁve episodes of GDP slowdowns, deﬁned as
growth rates lower than 1 percent: 1981 to 1983, 1988, 1990 to 1991, 1998
to 1999, 2003. The ﬁrst observation is that none is associated to a “hard”
current account reversal or a sudden stop, deﬁned as variation of 4 percent
of GDP—as these never occurred. Only 2003 is associated to a soft sudden
stop (2 percent of GDP), whereas 1983, 1989, and 2003 are associated to
soft (2 percent of GDP) current account reversals. This evidence would
seem to justify Edwards’s assertion that sudden stops by themselves are not
as important as current account reversals to explain GDP contractions.
Note, however, in the table that substantial reserves losses occurred either
previously to or simultaneously with the GDP slowdowns. More often
than not, such reserves losses were associated to domestic factors rather
than international shocks—the blow-up of the “Brazilian miracle” in the
early 1980s, the failed Cruzado plan of 1986, the after-eﬀect of the 1994
exchange rate based stabilization, and the “fear of Lula” in 2002. Thus,
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Table 3C.1 Brazil’s GDP slowdowns and external shocks, 1970–2004
Year CA Y$ Y% NKI deltaR deltaR/Y$ dCA/Y$ dNKI/Y$
1979 –10,708 222,285 7,624 –3,214 –1.45
1980 –12,739 236,841 9.2 9,610 –3,472 –1.47 0.91 0.89
1981 –11,706 257,269 –4.25 12,746 625 0.24 –0.44 1.32
1982 –16,273 269,900 0.83 12,101 –4,542 –1.68 1.78 –0.25
1983 –6,773 188,532 –2.93 7,419 –24 –0.01 –3.52 –1.73
1986 –5,323 256,509 7.49 1,432 –3,836 –1.50
1987 –1,438 280,949 3.53 3,259 1,015 0.36 –1.51 0.71
1988 4,180 304,185 –0.06 –2,098 1,249 0.41 –2.00 –1.91
1989 1,032 413,564 3.16 629 886 0.21 1.03 0.90
1990 –3,784 466,635 –4.35 4,592 481 0.10 1.16 0.96
1991 –1,407 405,097 –2.93 163 –369 –0.09 –0.51 –0.95
1992 6,109 387,277 5.4 9,947 14,670 3.79 –1.86 2.42
1997 –30,452 807,215 3.27 25,800 –7,907 –0.98
1998 –33,416 787,346 0.13 29,702 –7,970 –0.01 0.37 0.48
1999 –25,335 536,318 0.79 17,319 –7,822 –1.16 –1.03 –1.57
2000 –24,225 601,942 4.36 19,326 –2,262 –0.38 –0.21 0.37
2001 –23,215 509,623 1.31 27,052 3,307 0.65 –0.17 1.28
2002 –7,637 460,732 1.93 8,004 302 0.07 –3.06 –3.74
2003 4,177 505,533 0.54 5,111 8,496 1.68 –2.56 –0.63
2004 11,669 626,346 5.20 –7,310 2,244 0.36 –1.18 –2.46
Source: Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) data.
Notes: CA = Current account in US$ millions; Y$ = GDP in US$ millions; Y$ = GDP growth rate; 
NKI = net capital inﬂows in US$ millions; deltaR = change in international reserves in US$ millions;
dCA = change in the current account in US$ millions; dNKI = change in net capital inﬂows in US$
millions.Brazil’s experience suggests that the relevant variable for growth slow-
downs should be the cumulative reserve loss (i.e., current account deﬁcits
systematically higher than net capital inﬂows), rather than current account
reversals or sudden stops by themselves. Perhaps this could be a good start-
ing point for a new Edwards’s paper on the subject.
Finally, in the original paper a critical variable was missing—the ex-
change rate regime. Supposedly ﬂoating rates help mitigate sudden capital
splurges/stops as well as current account reversals, thus leading to less
GDP volatility. The paper now allows for this variable, and it does have the
expected impact. However, Edwards still does not provide an adequate test
for the impact of exchange rate regime change on the statistical signiﬁcance
of the dummies standing for the current account reversals and the sudden
stops.
Comment Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos
This is a very interesting paper that tries to shed light on an important
issue related to the real eﬀects of cross-border capital movements. The pa-
per is an empirical one, and, as such, the required tests present several diﬃ-
culties, especially regarding a study that works with economic data for a
wide range of countries.
The paper presents the argument’s procapital controls: (a) It reduces a
country’s vulnerability to external shocks and ﬁnancial crisis, and (b) it al-
lows countries that suﬀered a currency crisis to lower interest rate, imple-
ment progrowth policies, and emerge out of the crisis sooner.
The objective of the paper is to go against capital control and so dis-
qualify those claims. There is some evidence that high capital mobility is
not correlated with current account reversal or sudden stops. At least for
high capital mobility, the incidence of current account reversal is lower
(table 3.4, H   L).
For sudden stops, the paper does show little statistical evidence that they
occur more or less frequently in more open or closed capital accounts
(table 3.5).
In section 3.4, when he presents the second estimation of growth dy-
namics, the coeﬃcients that interact with the crisis indicator and capital
are found not signiﬁcant (table 3.8), so it is not possible to insure that the
more open the capital account is, the less severe is the crisis after, so he
could not have evidence against claim b.
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Brazil. He is currently chief economist for Citibank-Brazil.In section 3.3.1, Edwards explained how his index of capital mobility
was calculated.
• It ﬁlls the gap of missing variables using a STATA’s impute procedure.
• He used a two-order index, their lagged values, and two deﬁnitions of
openness.
One important aspect that is not present in the index is the amount of in-
ﬂow and outﬂow of capital. Large current account deﬁcits may therefore
imply large capital inﬂows. Capital mobility is also related to the liquidity
condition in the international capital markets; that is, supply and demand
conditions in the home and host countries of capital have to be taken into
consideration. It seems inconvenient to dissociate current account reversal
from sudden stops as these two eﬀects are part of just one event.
Developments in the external current account are directly related to the
inﬂows of capital to ﬁnance deﬁcits—directly through trade ﬁnancing or
indirectly through other capital inﬂows. If the country suﬀers a sudden
stop crisis, it is healthy if it is able to promote a current account reversal.
This reversal in general has an expenditure-switching component pro-
moted by the exchange rate devaluation and a reduction of expenditure
that causes recession.
My question is related to whether the standard errors in the growth
equations are corrected for the fact that the “reversal variable” is estimated
in a previous step. He uses a treatment with an instrument variable to avoid
endogeneity problems. So I think it is ﬁne.
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